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t  every  meeting  of  central  bankers, 
policy-makers  and  economists,  there 
seems to be agreement that creation of a 
‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of 
the euro. Yet, progress in building this union has 
been  painfully  slow.  The  Single  Supervisory 
Mechanism  (SSM)  may  not  be  ready  until  the 
middle  of  next  year;  the  Single  Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) may end up as a complicated 
mixture  between  bail-in  and  bail-out 
instruments,  funded  at  the  national  and  euro-
area levels; and common deposit insurance has 
been postponed into the indefinite future. What 
is making the establishment of Banking Union so 
difficult  are  the  protracted  fights  over  which 
government will be the payer of last resort when 
banks fail because of bad loans made in the past.1  
                                                   
1 The recent agreement by the Eurogroup highlights 
the  dilemma:  The  European  Stability  Mechanism 
(ESM) can acquire stakes in banks in difficulties, but 
only up to a limit of €60 billion and with participation 
of the country in which the particular problem banks 
reside.  Creditors  other  than  holders  of  insured 
deposits  are  to  be  ‘bailed  in’  as  a  rule,  but  many 
exceptions  to  the  rule  are  possible.  Moreover,  the 
European  Commission’s  proposal  for  a  bank 
restructuring  and  resolution  regime  is  highly 
controversial  and  resisted  by  German  officials  and 
bankers who fear a transfer of national sovereignty to 
the Commission that is not backed by the EU Treaty. 
If we continue along the present line, it does not 
seem likely that we shall ever reach full Banking 
Union.  Therefore  we  need  to  learn  from 
Copernicus  who  could  not  make  sense  of  the 
movement of planets as long as he assumed that 
the  sun  moved  around  the  earth.  But  once  he 
assumed the opposite, everything fell into place 
for  him.  So,  instead  of  trying  to  move  from 
common  bank  supervision,  over  to  bank 
resolution and then on to deposit insurance, let’s 
go backwards and start with deposit insurance, 
move  from  there  to  resolution  and  end  with 
supervision (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Step 1. A 100% reserve requirement for safe 
deposits 
We  start  by  defining  the  risk-free  asset  for  a 
euro-area  resident  with  short-term  and  long-
term financial liabilities (e.g. living expenses and 
nominal  debt):  This  is  the  asset  that  can  be 
converted into legal tender at face value at any 
time and under any circumstance. The concept of 
legal  tender  is  very  important  in  a  fiat  money 
system, in which money derives its value from 
government regulation or law, because it ensures 
that  we  can  settle  debt  with  almost  worthless 
paper or electronic bits. In a fiat money system 
the only legal tender is by definition central bank 
money.  Hence,  an  asset  is  risk-free  if  it  can  be 
converted into central bank money at any time. It 
is easy to see that only few assets would qualify 
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as  risk-free.  Most  importantly,  the  debt  of 
governments that do not control the issuance of 
legal tender, as is the case in EMU, or deposits of 
banks that are backed by credit to entities that 
also do not control the issuance of legal tender, 
are  not  risk-free.  All  these  assets  are  risky 
because  the  debtor  may not  be  able  to  convert 
them into legal tender at any time and under all 
circumstances.  
Hence,  in  EMU,  where  governments  have  no 
access  to  the  money  printing  press  of  the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the only risk-free 
asset  is  cash  issued  by  the  central  bank  and 
deposits  that  are  fully  backed  by  central  bank 
reserves  with  the  central  bank.  It  thus  follows 
that we need to establish safe bank deposits as 
deposits that are fully backed by banks’ holdings 
of central bank reserves. In other words, we can 
effectively insure deposits by introducing a 100% 
reserve requirement for this type of deposits. No 
industry  or  state  deposit  insurance  scheme  is 
required. A simple 100% reserve requirement is 
sufficient.2 
But would a deposit insurance scheme based on 
a 100% reserve requirement be at all possible in 
our  present  system?  The  answer,  of  course,  is 
yes: To back ‘insured’ deposits created earlier by 
fractional reserve banking, banks could borrow 
central  bank  reserves  in  the  necessary  amount 
and keep them on deposit with the central bank. 
The  cost  of  these  safe  deposits  for  the  banks 
would be determined by the difference between 
the lending rate for central bank reserves and the 
deposit rate for central bank money. The cost for 
the bank customer would be determined by the 
net cost of central bank funds for the banks and 
the  banks’  operating  costs  for  the  insured 
deposits. The benefit for the customer would be 
to have a safe asset other than only central bank 
                                                   
2 The idea of 100% reserve coverage of deposits is of 
course not new. As Huerta de Soto has pointed out, it 
dates  back  to  the  school  of  Salamanca  in  the  16th 
century, was taken up in the UK Bank Charter Act of 
1844  and  is  advocated  today  by  followers  of  the 
Austrian School of Economics and others (see Jesus 
Huerta de Soto, “Money, Bank Credit, and Economic 
Cycles”,  Ludwig  von  Mises  Institute,  Auburn  AL, 
2012). 
notes, and the ability to use this asset to make 
non-cash payments.  
A quantitative limit for safe deposits would not 
be necessary as the central bank could adjust the 
supply  of  reserves  to  the  demand  for  safe 
deposits. But the central bank could influence the 
demand  for  safe  deposits  by  changing  the 
variable costs, which are given by the difference 
between the cost of central bank reserves and the 
rate that the central bank pays on deposits. This 
could  be  used  for  stabilisation  policy:  By 
influencing the demand for safe deposits relative 
to other deposits, the ECB would also influence 
credit extension by the banks. 
Assume  that  customers  switch  from  investor 
deposits  to  safe  deposits.  If  the  ECB  kept  the 
supply of central bank reserves constant, banks 
would  need  to  reduce  credit  to  free  funds  for 
deposit with the ECB as cover for the additional 
safe  deposits.  Credit  to  the  non-bank  sector 
would  go  down,  and  the  credit  multiplier, 
defined as credit relative to central bank money, 
would fall. Alternatively, if the ECB wanted to 
accommodate the switch and keep credit to the 
non-bank sector constant, they could increase the 
supply  by  central  bank  reserves  to  meet  the 
additional  demand.  Still  the  credit  multiplier 
would decline, albeit by less than before, because 
the  central  bank  money  stock  would  increase. 
Finally, if the ECB wanted the credit multiplier 
to  remain  constant,  they  could  raise  the 
alternative  costs  of  holding  safe  deposits  by 
lowering the deposit rate. The reduction of the 
deposit rate needed to achieve the target level of 
safe  deposits  could  be  determined  in  a  reverse 
refinancing operation, where banks submit bids 
for the deposit rate they are willing to accept (or 
pay when the deposit rate is negative).3 
 
 
                                                   
3  Banks  in  Germany  and  certain  other  euro  area 
countries today already hold large amounts of central 
bank  reserves.  However,  these  reserve  holdings  are 
motivated by the banks’ reluctance to lend to other 
banks  in  other  euro  area  countries  and  are  not 
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Step 2. A hierarchy of loss-absorbing bank 
liabilities 
Once  we  have  established  reserve-backed 
deposits as safe assets, all other bank liabilities 
would of course be risky. We can now define a 
hierarchy of loss absorption in a bank resolution 
regime. The first loss would of course be borne 
by  the  equity  tranche  on  the  liability  side  of 
banks’  balance  sheets.  After  having  set  aside 
assets pledged to cover secured debt, the second 
and third losses would be borne by junior and 
senior unsecured bank debt. The fourth and last 
loss  would  accrue  to  deposits  uncovered  by 
central  bank  reserves.  When  all  bank  liabilities 
except  deposits  fully  covered  by  central  bank 
reserves  contribute  to  cover  losses  on  bank 
assets,  taxpayer-funded  bank  bailouts  would 
become  significantly  less  likely  (and  will 
eventually  become  unnecessary).  As  long  as 
banks  engage  in  maturity  transformation, 
systemic  liquidity  crises  remain  possible  and  a 
lender-of-last resort necessary.  
However, the risk of a liquidity crisis could be 
reduced if the scope for maturity transformation 
would be limited in the regulatory framework. 
Moreover, when the public fully understands the 
risk  associated  with  an  exposure  to  banks 
beyond the reserve-backed safe deposit, it would 
be up to banks to reassure bank equity investors 
and creditors that their assets are being managed 
in  a  way  that  makes  illiquidity  and  losses 
become unlikely. 
Step 3. Divest banks from governments by 
revised regulations for government debt 
To  be  able  to  fund  their  assets  at  reasonable 
costs, banks would need to have a comfortable 
equity  cushion  and  a  well-diversified  and 
reasonably  liquid  portfolio  of  assets.  Most 
importantly,  they  would  have  to  reduce  their 
exposure  to  government  debt  to  a  level 
consistent with this debt being subject to default 
risk.  Hence,  in  the  new  regulatory  regime, 
government  debt  would  have  to  be  backed  by 
equity at least in part (with the rest backed by 
other  loss-absorbing  bank  liabilities),  and  it 
would  have  to  be  subject  to  limits  for  single 
credit  exposure.  To  allow  banks’  divestment 
from  government  debt,  the  European  Central 
Bank  could  buy  in  a  one-off  operation  the 
government  bonds  that  banks have  pledged  to 
the  central  bank  as  collateral  for  obtaining 
central bank credit, and place them in a special 
account that will be wound down over time. 
As a result of this operation, risky claims of the 
banks  on  governments  would  be  replaced  by 
risk-free claims of the banks on the ECB or, in 
other words, by central bank reserves. The ECB 
would of course want to reduce its exposure to 
government debt over time.  
Since it is very doubtful that all highly indebted 
euro-area  countries  could  repay  their  debt, 
governments  and  the  ECB  could  agree  that  all 
income from seigniorage would be used to pay 
down the government debt held by the ECB in 
the special account. Since the present discounted 
value of seigniorage can be very large, reaching 
several trillion euros in the case of the euro area, 
depending  on  interest  rates  on  central  bank 
credit  and  the  growth  rate  of  non-interest-
bearing central bank money, it seems likely that 
this would be sufficient to eventually retire the 
government debt acquired by the ECB from the 
banks.  Alternatively,  since  a  significant  part  of 
the government bonds acquired by the ECB from 
banks  would  have  fairly  short  maturities,  the 
position of the ECB could be reduced by simply 
letting the bonds run down.  
The  arrangement  outlined  here  has  some 
resemblance  to  the  debt  redemption  fund 
proposed  by  the  German  Council  of  Economic 
Experts.  However,  an  important  difference  is 
that  in  the  arrangement  proposed  above,  the 
ECB would withhold revenue to pay down the 
debt and would not have to rely on governments 
to allocate revenue for this purpose. 
Part  of  the  reserves  obtained  by  selling 
government bond holdings to the ECB could be 
used initially by the banks to back safe deposits. 
The rest could be released by the ECB into the 
banking  system  and  the  economy  at  large  by 
setting a rate for central bank deposits below the 
risk-adjusted bank lending rates. With their debt 
now  subject  to  default  risk,  highly  indebted 
governments  might  encounter  difficulties 
accessing the market at reasonable costs to roll 
over expiring debt. But market access could be 
improved if the ECB agreed to assume the status 
of  a  junior  creditor  for  the  government  bonds 4 | THOMAS MAYER 
 
  
they have acquired from banks in case of a debt 
restructuring.  
Like the orderly pay down of the debt, the costs 
for  such  a  restructuring  could  be  covered  by 
future seigniorage income. This would represent 
a  partial  mutualisation  of  public  debt,  but 
because  of  its  limited  character  it  would 
probably  be  acceptable  for  countries  with 
stronger balance sheets. 
Balance sheet effects of safe deposits 
Table A2 in the Appendix shows the structure of 
banks’  balance  sheets  after  the  introduction  of 
safe deposits. Abstracting from assets earmarked 
for  covered  bonds,  banks  would  have  central 
bank reserves and credit on the asset side of the 
balance sheet, as before. However, central bank 
reserves would be tied to cover safe deposits on 
the liability side of the balance sheet. All other 
liabilities would participate in loss absorption in 
a  clearly  defined  hierarchy,  with  equity 
providing  the  first  layer  and  investor  deposits 
(not covered to 100% by central bank reserves) 
the last. Given our definition of a safe deposit, it 
corresponds to what are at present called “sight 
deposits”.  In  April  2013,  sight  deposits  in  the 
euro area amounted to €4.4 trillion, representing 
about 38% of total deposits or 44% of GDP.  
Since  customers  would  probably  not  choose  to 
have  all  sight  deposits  in  the  form  of  safe 
deposits,  this  would  represent  an  upper 
boundary to the level of safe deposits. In April 
2013, banks held €556 billion as reserves with the 
Eurosystem  (€273  billion  of  which  counted  as 
minimum  reserves).  Hence,  the  introduction  of 
safe  deposits  would  substantially  increase 
reserve  holdings  and  the  Eurosystem’s  balance 
sheet  (presently  only  €2.5  trillion).  But  this 
would only change the mix between inside and 
outside money and not affect the overall size of 
the balance sheet of the monetary and financial 
system. 
Table A3 in the Appendix shows the structure of 
the  balance  sheet  of  the  ECB.  As  can  be  seen 
from  this  table  together  with  Table  A2,  safe 
deposits, like bank notes in circulation, represent 
a direct liability of the ECB to the non-banking 
sector. Against this stands the ‘good will’ on the 
asset  side  of  the  central  bank’s  balance  sheet, 
which reflects the trust invested by the public in 
money  as  a  means  of  exchange  and  store  of 
value.4 
As  explained  above,  the  central  bank  can 
influence  the  mix  between  safe  deposits  and 
investor deposits by determining the alternative 
costs  of  safe  deposits.  Since  investor  deposits 
fund bank credit, this allows the central bank to 
influence credit extension by the banking system. 
Banks  can  of  course  still  engage  in  maturity 
transformation  by  funding  longer-term  credit 
with  rolling  short-term  investor  deposits.  But 
holders  of  investor  deposits  would  be  exposed 
not  only  to  credit  but  also  to  liquidity  risks 
associated  with  maturity  transformation.  Since 
they  would  demand  a  risk  premium  as 
compensation, there would be an economic limit 
to maturity transformation. 
In a growing economy, the central bank may not 
only want to influence the mix between safe and 
investor deposits but also the size of the balance 
sheet  of  the  banking  sector.  It  can  do  so  by 
writing  up  ‘good  will’  in  its  balance  sheet  and 
crediting safe deposits with this amount.5 Thus, 
new  central  bank  money  would  come  into 
existence in a neutral way and would not benefit 
any sector in particular (as would be the case if 
the  central  bank  would  create  new  money  by 
                                                   
4 At first glance, the backing of money by ‘good will’ 
in the central bank’s balance sheet may look unsound. 
Proponents of 100% reserve backing of deposits have 
therefore suggested that the central bank issue money 
against government bonds when it wants to increase 
the  central  bank  money  stock.  But  this  only 
camouflages the lack of a material cover of money in a 
fiat money system—and it may tempt the government 
to  fund  its  expenses  through  the  money  printing 
press. The fact is that the only cover of money in a fiat 
money system is people’s trust in money, and this is 
most  honestly  accounted  for  by  ‘good  will’  in  the 
central bank’s balance sheet. 
5 A write-up of ‘good will’ could be triggered by an 
increase in the demand for money as a result of an 
increase in potential GDP. In this case, the price level 
would fall if no new money was issued. As long as 
price rigidities exist, this may not seem desirable. A COPERNICAN TURN IN BANKING UNION URGENTLY NEEDED| 5 
 
  
buying  newly  issued  government  bonds,  as 
suggested by some).6 
A more level playing field 
The  proposed  structure  for  Banking  Union 
would of course change the way in which banks 
operate  and  governments  fund  themselves. 
Banks would no longer extend credit and create 
book money at will. Rather, they would assume 
the  dual  role  of  1)  safe  keeper  of  the  risk-free 
assets,  i.e.  central  bank  money,  for  depositor-
savers,  and  2)  intermediary  of  funds  between 
investor-savers and entrepreneurs. 
It  is  possible  that  bank  lending  rates  would 
increase, but if they do, then only because savers 
realise  that  in  a  fractional  reserve  banking 
system  bank  deposits  carry  credit  risk,  unless 
they  are  fully  backed  by  banks’  holdings  of 
central  bank  reserves.  In  fact,  the  widespread 
misconception that bank deposits in our present 
system  of  fractional  reserve  banking  are 
completely safe and can be converted into central 
bank money at any time and in all circumstances 
represents a subsidy to bank lending rates (and 
bank profits).  
Governments could no longer rely on banks to 
fund  their  debt  and  would  have  to  obtain 
funding  from  the  capital  markets.  Borrowing 
costs could also increase for them as they would 
no longer be regarded as offering risk-free assets 
and  could  no  longer  benefit  from  preferential 
treatment on banks’ balance sheets in the form of 
zero-risk  weighting  for  the  calculation  of 
regulatory  capital  requirements  and  exemption 
from  single-credit  exposure  limits.  Again,  such 
an increase in borrowing costs would represent 
the end of a subsidy to government borrowing as 
a result of special regulatory treatment. 
 
 
                                                   
6 Economists of the Austrian school have pointed out 
that  the  creation  of  money  via  bank  credit  or 
government  spending  benefits  those  close  to  the 
process of money creation and puts at a disadvantage 
those far away from it. The latter will not obtain new 
money but may suffer from price increases triggered 
by the money injection. 
Conclusion 
To  sum  up,  Banking  Union  could  be  built  in 
three  steps.  In  the  first  step,  deposit  insurance 
could  be  introduced  in  the  euro  area  by 
requiring banks to fully back safe deposits with 
central  bank  reserves.  This  would  be  the  only 
safe  asset  in  EMU,  where,  as  already  noted, 
governments have no command over the money 
printing press of the central bank. All other bank 
liabilities would participate in covering losses on 
the  asset  side  of  banks’  balance  sheets  in  a 
hierarchical  order  established  by  the  common 
bank  resolution  regime  in  the  second  step.  To 
help banks divest from government bonds, the 
ECB could buy these bonds from them, replacing 
risky  claims  of  banks  on  governments  by  risk-
free claims of banks on the ECB in the third step. 
Governments  and  the  ECB  could  agree  to  use 
future  seigniorage  income  to  pay  down  the 
government debt held by the ECB.  6 | THOMAS MAYER 
 
  
Appendix  
Table A1. The Copernican turn for Banking Union 
Present approach  Proposed approach 
Step 1 
Establish SSM on the basis of the regulatory framework 
mapped out in CRDIV.* 
Step 1 
Establish deposit insurance by requiring safe deposits to 
be backed 100% by banks’ holding of reserves with the 
central bank. 
Step 2 
Establish SRM backed by a government-funded 
restructuring and resolution fund. 
Step 2 
Establish SRM with hierarchical loss absorption of all 
bank liabilities except safe deposits. Resolution fund 
would operate only in the transition to new regime, and 
then would no longer be required. 
Step 3 
Keep deposit insurance under national authority. 
Step 3 
Establish SSM on the basis of CRDIV, modified to 
introduce positive risk weights and single credit 
exposure limits for government debt. The ECB would 
help divest banks from government bonds and redeem 
the ECB’s acquired government bond portfolio by 
withholding seigniorage income over time.  
* CRDIV is the legislative package of proposals adopted by the European Commission on 20 July 2011 to replace the current 
Capital Requirements Directives and strengthen the regulation of the banking sector.  
 
Table A2. The structure of bank balance sheets in the new regime 
Assets  Liabilities 
                       Central bank reserves                                  Safe deposits 
                       Ring-fenced assets                                  Covered bonds 
                       Other assets                                  Investor-deposits* 
                                Senior debt* 
                                Junior debt* 
                                Equity* 
* Participating in losses in ascending order. 
 
 
Table A3. The structure of the central bank’s balance sheet in the new regime 
Assets  Liabilities 
Good will  Deposits of commercial bank 
reserves to cover safe deposits 
Other assets  Other liabilities, reserves, and 
capital 
 
 
 